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LEGISLATIVE SUGGESTIONS
NEEDED PROPERTY LEGISLATION IN
WISCONSIN
BY CARL B. Rix.
Our courts are continually calling the attention of the legal
profession to needed legislation and it is the purpose of this
article to suggest remedial legislation sorely needed in the State
of Wisconsin.
This is an age of accumulation of great wealth, principally
in the many forms of personal property. The growth of fortunes
during the decade, and particularly within the last two years,
expressed in figures would be interesting and illuminating, but
such figures are not necessary in this article. General knowledge
will prove sufficient for our purposes. Coupled with the growth
of fortunes goes the inevitable desire for the makers of such
fortunes to perpetuate them in their families. For centuries such
perpetuation has been held to be against public policy and the
result of that feeling has been expressed in probably the greatest
example of judicial legislation, known as the Rule Against Per-
petuities. Every student recalls the difference between the rule
of remoteness of vesting and suspension of alienation. That
expression of public policy was developed principally as applied
to real property because of the relatively greater importance of
real than personal property. Furthermore every state in this
country has expressed that public policy in its constitution or
statutes. The rule in regard to real property is found in Sections
2038 and 2o39 of the Revised Statutes of Wisconsin. Section
2038 is as follows: "Every future estate shall be void in its
creation which shall suspend the absolute power of alienation for
a longer period than is prescribed in this chapter; such power
of alienation is suspended when there are no persons in being
by whom absolute fee in possession can be conveyed." Section
2039 is as follows: "The absolute power of alienation shall not
be suspended by any limitation or condition whatever for a
longer period than during the continuance of two lives in being
at the creation of the estate, and twenty-one years thereafter,
except in the single case mentioned in the next section, and
except when real estate is given, granted or devised to a charitable
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use or to literary or charitable corporations, which shall have been
organized under the laws of this state for their sole use and
benefit, or to any cemetery corporation, society or association."
Fourteen years ago in Becker vs. Chester, 115 Wis. 9o, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that there is no statutory or
common law rule against perpetuities of personal property in this
state, and that there is nothing to prevent a man from tying up
his personal property for all time to come. For our purpose it
is not necessary to enter into the famous controversy in which
Justice Cassoday so vigorously expressed his dissent. It is not
necessary either to discuss the merits of the majority decision or
to decide whether or not the decision of the court was clearly
obiter as contended by Justice Cassoday. As that decision has been
approved in other cases since Becker vs. Chester, this state is
definitely committed to the rule that there is no statute to prevent
a perpetuity in personal property in Wisconsin, and that the com-
mon law as to perpetuities respecting such property is not in
force in this state. With that situation before us it is necessary
that we heed the words of the dissenting justice when. he says:
"While I have no doubt that my brethren have made the ruling
here complained of in pursuance of a sense of duty, nevertheless
I have been constrained to write this separate opinion in which
I have attempted, in a respectful manner, to expose what I regard
as a legal monstrosity in the hope that the legislature may do
something to relieve the State of Wisconsin from being the only
state in the union where personal property may be given in trust
for private purposes and rendered unalienable for all time."
Will it take the will of one of our wealthy citizens, who ties
up his huge estate in personal property for an indefinite period
in the future to cause us to ask the legislature to correct this
apparent evil?
The statutes of Wisconsin in regard to to real property were
adopted from those of New York. The statutes of that state pro-
vide as follows:
i. The absolute ownership of personal property shall not
be suspended by any limitation or condition whatever for a
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longer period than during the continuance and until the termina-
tion of not more than two lives in being at the date of the instru-
ment containing such limitation or condition; or, if such instru-
ment be a will, for not more than two lives in being at the death
of the testator.
2. In all other respects limitation of future or contingent
interests in personal property shall be subject to the rules pre-
scribed in the first chapter of this act in relation to future estates
in lands.
It is clear that this situation should be promptly remedied
by the adoption of legislation substantially similar to that of
New York. A provision in the will to convert realty into
personalty can put all of a man's property into a perpetuity
and increases the danger many fold. Concerted action to remedy
this situation is absolutely imperative and the duty to act rests
upon the members of the bar through the proper associations.
The people of the state are entitled to look to the legal profession
for guidance in such matters as these and it will be pure luck,
after fourteen years of neglect, if remedial legislation is obtained
preventing any odius and harmful perpetuities.
It was Bacon who said "the law favors three things, life,
liberty and dower." It is remarkable that this provision for
the widow, known as dower, has come down through the years
practically unchanged except where other and more ample pro-
vision has been made as in the case of community property. The
courts have been zealous to protect and safeguard this right. The
marked freedom of change in the essentials and requirements of
dower is shown by the fact that one of the feudal rules of prop-
erty, the necessity of seizing of an estate, has come down with it,
and the husband today must be seized of an estate of inheritance
to entitle the wife to dower.
At the time of the passage of the Statutes of Uses in 1535
curtesy and dower could not be had of equitable estates. The
manifest advantages of that statute were so great in spite of its
perversion by the rules that a use could not be raised upon a use
and that the statute did not apply to active trusts, that the courts
of equity were quick to allay some of the feeling against equitable
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estates by permitting the equitable rights to be taken for debts
and by granting curtesy in such estates. But no change was
made in the rule as to dower in such estates. No doubt the
rights of mere woman were not then claiming the careful atten-
tion of courts and legislatures with the results so ably described
in another article of this issue. In due time this situation was
remedied in England and dower was granted in equitable estates.
For years it was taken for granted in Wisconsin that the right
of dower attached to all estates, legal or equitable.
In the case of Will of Prsser, 140 Wis. 92, the question
arose as to the right of a widow of a holder of a vested re-
mainder to dower in such remainder. The court gave the use of
the property to the wife for life and after her death the executors
were to hold the estate in trust for ten years with active trust
duties, and at the expiration of the ten years all of the property
was devised and bequeathed to all the children in equal parts.
The widow died and one of the sons died, leaving a widow and
one minor child. The court held that the remainders were vested
and then passed on to the consideration of the question of dower,
and the court says: "At common law there was no dower right
in a reversion or remainder after a freehold estate, unless the
freehold estate terminated during the life of the husband; but
there was dower in a reversion or remainder after an estate for
years. i Washb. R. P. 6th Ed. par. 365. At common law also
there was no dower in an equitable estate. The husband must
have had legal title. Id. par. 374. In England and in many of
the states in this country this latter rule has been changed by
statute, and dower given out of equitable estates. Id. par. 375.
Our statute, however, says nothing of equitable estates and
doubtless is to be regarded as simply giving dower out of legal
estates, as was the case at common law, Sec. 2159 Stats. 1898;
i Scribner, Dower, Ch. i9, par. 20 et seq. p. 4oo."
Plainly the estate during the ten year term was equitable
and the court proceeded to find a way out by applying Section
2087, R. S. of Wisconsin, which declares that the grantee
of an equitable estate shall have a legal estate in the lands as
against all persons, except the trustees and those lawfully claim-
ing under them.. The court says "Such was Theodore Prasser's
interest here. It was vested, subject only to the execution of
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the trust, and was a legal estate as against all persons except the
trustees whose term was for years only. Why should not his
widow have dower in this legal estate?"
It was only a short time before the bad penny returned. In
the case of Harley vs. Harley, reported in the same volume, 14o
Wis. p. 282, the question again arose as to the right of dower
in an equitable estate. The husband died, having fully completed
a contract of purchase of realty thereby acquiring the equitable
title, but the legal title had not been conveyed to him. The
court says at page 288: "The question of whether a widow is
entitled to dower in real estate of which her husband dies pos-
sessed of only a mere equitable title has been recently considered
and resolved in the negative by this court in Will of Prasser,
ante p. 92. It was there said that an estate of inheritance, as the
term is used in the statute, is just what such term signifies at
common law, consequently that the statute gives dower only out
of legal estates. But where the husband dies seized of the full
equitable title and the owner of the whole beneficial interest with
only the mere legal title outstanding, and the person having no
duty to perform in respect to the property, as in this case, but
to convey it to the equitable owner, the estate is to all intents
and purposes a legal estate,-an estate of inheritance within
the meaning of the statute, in which the wife is entitled to
dower. * * * It is in harmony with the doctrine of this court
that the dower right is to be favored in the law (Munger vs.
Perkins, 62 Wis. 499) and the better rule as we are constrained
to believe. If the statute will reasonably permit of a construction
which will save the dower right and also one which will defeat it,
and there is uncertainty as to what was in the mind of the law-
makers when it was adopted, the former should prevail. At
such time as now, such interest in real property as that of which
appellant's husband died possessed, was regarded as realty; an
estate of inheritance in the broad sense of the term, which passes
to the heirs and to which the homestead right attaches. We are
entirely satisfied with the decision recently rendered, treating a
full equitable title and ownership of the entire beneficial interest
in realty a right to be immediately clothed with the legal title,
as here, as substantially a legal estate and within the meaning of
the dower statute."
